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Adversarial Linkages: The Urban Poor 
and Electoral Politics in Jakarta 
Amalinda Savirani and Edward Aspinall 
Abstract: This article examines how social movements based in poor 
communities make electoral alliances with politicians in contemporary 
Indonesia. Drawing on case studies of the urban poor in two elections in 
Jakarta, we point to a pattern of adversarial linkages by which movements 
present candidates with demands – in this case about housing and liveli-
hood security – which are then distilled in formal ‘political contracts’. 
Unlike institutionalised relationships between parties and social constitu-
encies in many democracies, these linkages are ad hoc, pragmatic and 
characterised by mistrust. In Jakarta, they involved disaggregation rather 
than aggregation of interests, with movement actors in the second elec-
tion in 2017 seeking concrete gains relating to land and livelihoods in 
particular neighbourhoods, rather than a broad programme of urban 
reform, as had been their goal in 2012. We suggest that such adversarial 
linkages are a feature of contemporary Indonesian politics. They allow 
marginal groups to make contingent political gains but are compatible 
with prevailing clientelistic patterns, which limit their potential to pro-
mote systemic change. 
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Introduction 
How do social movements rooted among poor and marginalised citizens 
bargain with politicians, and win concessions from them, when electoral 
competition is personalised and clientelistic? This article1 addresses this 
question by examining the 2017 gubernatorial election in the Indonesian 
capital of Jakarta, focusing on an alliance between a movement repre-
senting members of the urban poor dislocated by urban redevelopment 
and the winning candidate, Anies Baswedan. Taking our cue both from 
literature on voter-politician linkages, and from recent debates about the 
nature of political representation in Indonesia, we point to an emerging 
pattern of adversarial linkages in Indonesian local politics. In this pattern, 
interest groups – especially, but not limited to, groups representing low-
er-class constituencies – seek mutually beneficial alliances with political 
candidates, exchanging electoral support for policy or particularistic 
concessions. These linkages are adversarial in that they are characterised 
by a significant degree of mistrust, especially suspicion on the part of the 
movement actors that politicians will renege on their promises to citizens. 
Accordingly, a defining feature of these coalitions is that they are embod-
ied in formal “political contracts” (kontrak politik) by which the interest 
group tries to bind the candidate to an agreed set of concessions. 
Literature on relations between politicians and citizens in democra-
cies has identified three archetypal linkage types: programmatic, in which 
parties promise packages of broadly applicable policies; clientelistic, in 
which they target material goods and other benefits in a particularistic 
manner at individual voters or small groups; and charismatic, or populist, 
founded on the personal authority or appeal of a leader (Kitschelt 2000; 
Stokes 2009). The alliance formation studied in the present article was a 
hybrid of the first two types. The social movement upon which we focus 
ultimately eschewed the broad policy promises typical of programmatic 
politics, having felt betrayed by the failure of the incumbent governor to 
honour earlier commitments to respect the rights of the urban poor. 
Instead, the political contract drawn up with Anies Baswedan in 2017 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the Indonesia Project at the Australian Na-
tional University, which funded the project (ANU Indonesia Project Research 
Grants 2016/2017) through Amalinda Savirani. We also thank Ekamara Anana-
mi, Amita, and Resandy for their research assistance. Aspinall’s fieldwork was 
funded by the Australian Research Council (FT120100742). Savirani used a 
small portion of fieldwork data from the “Citizenship sub Project”, part of the 
“Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD)” research cooperation between Uni-
versitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia, and University of Oslo, Norway. 
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was highly particularistic, detailing land status changes and other desired 
outcomes in named precincts and neighbourhoods. But this was not a 
purely clientelistic exchange: the group did not accept the material re-
wards that are commonly distributed in exchange for political support in 
Indonesian elections. 
In making this analysis, we seek to contribute to recent debates 
about the nature of political representation and power in contemporary 
Indonesia. Over the last decade or so, analyses of Indonesian politics, 
especially at the subnational level, have shown that the organs of local 
democracy have been captured by elites, many of whom derive their 
influence from the fusion of state and economic power that character-
ised the authoritarian “New Order” regime (1966–1998). Facilitating this 
elite capture has been so-called “money politics” – a monetisation of 
political relationships that includes such phenomena as ticket-purchasing 
by candidates, vote-buying during elections, and lavish funding of pri-
vately-organised campaign teams, all sustained by rent-seeking behav-
iours in office (Hidayat 2007; Hadiz 2010; Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016; 
Mietzner 2007). This elite capture is widespread and obvious, and has 
not been seriously debated by scholars. However, one forceful interpre-
tation – the “oligarchy thesis” promoted in slightly different forms by 
Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz (2004) and Jeffrey Winters (2011) – has 
been challenged by analysts who view it as overly totalising. Some critics 
have noted various ways in which non-oligarchic forces exercise political 
influence, especially in policy-making (Mietzner 2013; Aspinall 2014). 
Others have drawn attention to electoral interventions by groups repre-
senting lower-class interests, such as labour unions, farmers’ groups or 
associations of informal traders (Aspinall 2013b; Ford 2014; Ford and 
Pepinsky 2014; Gibbings, Lazuardi and Prawirosusanto 2017; Mahsun 
2017; Savirani 2016). One large action research project, in which one of 
the authors of the current article (Savirani) participated, aimed to en-
courage “democratic political blocs” through which popular movements 
would engage in electoral politics. The idea was that activists needed to 
save local democracy from elite capture by building electoral coalitions 
of civil society organisations and popular movements of labour, farmers 
and the urban poor (Priyono et al. 2007). 
The present article builds on this strand in the literature but also 
step backs from it to make a more general characterisation of the emerg-
ing pattern of linkages between social movements and elected politicians 
in contemporary Indonesia. The coalition we observe in Jakarta was 
almost entirely uninstitutionalised, being based on an ad hoc deal 
reached between the candidate and representatives of the urban poor 
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movement, with the help of several mediators who had feet in both 
camps. The coalition was not embedded in any institutionalised connec-
tion between social movement organisations and a party, as is often the 
case in party systems based on well-defined cleavage structures. Social 
movements representing lower-class interests in Indonesia have little 
choice but to engage in one-off transactions of the sort described in this 
article, rather than in the systematic and structured interest aggregation 
that is the sine qua non of programmatic politics. Rather than representing 
a fundamental challenge to Indonesia’s clientelistic political order, such 
lower-class electoral engagement is thus readily accommodated within it, 
and represents just one element within the kaleidoscopically fragmented 
political order of post-Soeharto Indonesia (Aspinall 2013a). However, 
the case also shows that popular movements can gain access to the poli-
cy process, both by relying on the skills of movement entrepreneurs and 
allied intellectuals, and by improving their own technical knowledge and 
capacity. Finally, by making this argument we also seek to shed light on 
the politics of the urban poor in Indonesia. While this is an important 
group, it has been largely neglected in literature on Indonesian politics 
(Wilson 2017). 
We develop our argument through several sections. First, we intro-
duce the Indonesian case and our framework on politician–citizen link-
ages. Second, we introduce the urban poor and its politics in Jakarta. 
Third, we discuss initial attempts to forge an electoral alliance during the 
2012 gubernatorial election, during which urban poor activists supported 
populist candidate Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Although movement activists 
were generally satisfied with Jokowi’s performance in office, policies of 
evictions without negotiation resumed in 2014 once he was elected pres-
ident and was succeeded by his deputy, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popu-
larly known as Ahok) as governor, fuelling disillusionment. Fourth, we 
explore the formation of a new electoral alliance during the 2017 guber-
natorial election, when activists replaced the broad programmatic sweep 
of the 2012 political contract with disaggregated, particularistic demands. 
Fifth, we examine how members of the urban poor movement tried to 
ensure that the commitments in the political contract became embodied 
in policy after the election. Finally, we conclude by considering other 
examples of such social movement electoral engagement and the light 
they shed on Indonesian politics more broadly. 
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Politician–Citizen Linkages  
Much of the literature on linkages between politicians or political parties 
and social movements discusses situations in which parties are deeply 
embedded in and organically connected to particular social milieus. Par-
ties themselves are often products of social movements. Obvious exam-
ples are the social democratic parties of Europe and elsewhere that were 
formed by labour unions, or the Islamist parties that arose from Islamic 
educational, charitable and similar organisations in many countries. In 
other cases, existing political parties develop linkages with new social 
movements by incorporating their issues into their existing platforms 
“through techniques of programmatic unity building” (Kitschelt 2000: 
848). This, in short, is the model of the programmatic party, by which 
political parties incorporate and express the interests of particular social 
constituencies, allowing them to “map their issue positions on a simple 
conceptual alternative (Left and Right) based on underlying programmat-
ic principles” (Kitschelt 2000: 848). Programmatic politics involves a 
process of interest aggregation in which the particular interests of small 
groups are abstracted and absorbed into over-arching policy positions 
that are then offered as bundles to the electorate. 
In Indonesia, some parties possess organic connections to civil so-
ciety groups. Notably, several parties have deep connections with Islamic 
social networks. Examples include the National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the mass-based traditionalist organisa-
tion, Nahdlatul Ulama; the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Na-
sional, PAN) and the modernist organisation Muhammadiyah, and the 
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and the Mus-
lim-Brotherhood-influenced tarbiyah movement (Machmudi 2008). Such 
connections are partly ideological, in that these parties express the 
worldview of the parent movement, but also pragmatic in that elected 
politicians from these parties also direct state resources toward the par-
ent movement when feasible. 
In Indonesia’s electoral democracy, however, two factors have im-
peded development of a generalised pattern of institutionalised connec-
tion between social movements and parties. The first factor is particular 
to poor communities: the historical elimination of the Left. The Left was 
wiped out in 1965–1966 and has never been able to resurrect itself as a 
mass force. Partly as a result, the typical left–right cleavage structure that 
defines party systems in many democracies is absent in Indonesia. The 
absence of a significant social-democratic or left-wing party based on the 
lower classes is frequently noted as one major source of the limited na-
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ture of the post-Soeharto democratisation (e.g., Robison and Hadiz 2004: 
134–135; Winters 2011: 181).  
The second factor is the emergence of a generalised pattern of cli-
entelistic politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia. In clientelistic systems, 
politicians “create bonds with their following through direct, personal, 
and typically material side payments” (Kitschelt 2000: 849). Although 
space limitations prevent a thorough examination of the emergence of 
this pattern here, one obvious source is the adoption in Indonesia of 
candidate-centred rather than party–centred electoral systems (see, for 
example, Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009; Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016). The 
result that is that candidates for elective office have incentives to pro-
mote their individual candidacies and appeal to constituents by offering 
them particularistic benefits, rather than to pool their efforts and coop-
erate with copartisans in constructing broadly appealing programmes. A 
strongly personalised electoral pattern has emerged in which candidates 
for office construct personal success teams and woo voters by delivering 
them material benefits – whether in the form of pork-barrel projects or 
club goods to communities, or cash payments and other gifts to individ-
uals. 
One feature of this clientelistic landscape is a pattern of transaction-
al deal-making, in which candidates bargain with local community repre-
sentatives, offering them specified benefits in exchange for the votes of 
the community they lead. Such representatives are typically village heads, 
religious leaders, clan chiefs or similar informal leaders, and the benefits 
are usually club goods such as repairs to a road, houses of worship or 
other community infrastructure, or gifts of sports equipment to a local 
youth group, livestock to the farmers’ cooperative, cooking equipment to 
a women’s welfare group and so on. Such agreements are sometimes 
spelled out in a written “political contract” (kontrak politik) that gives the 
appearance of being legally binding. Such political contracts are a “new 
phenomenon in Indonesian politics” (Gibbings, Lazuardi and Prawirosu-
santo 2017: 252). Both authors have observed such political contracts in 
widely varying electoral contexts (see also Sulaiman 2016: 63–64; Rohi 
2016: 380). In form, political contracts borrow from the language of 
business agreements; they typically spell out a number of commitments 
that the candidate promises to deliver should he or she be elected. 
Such political contracts are also products of the climate of general-
ised mistrust of politicians and their promises in contemporary Indone-
sian society. Anti-party or anti-politician sentiment has been observed 
since early in the democratisation process, but has become entrenched as 
‘money politics’ has spread, along with widely held assumptions among 
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voters that candidates seek office simply to benefit themselves, their 
family or their group. Therefore, as Rudi Rohi (2016: 380) has explained, 
some politicians try to overcome this trust deficit by offering formal 
contracts in order to borrow “the symbols of legal procedure and finan-
cial transactions—contracts—to convince voters that they would fulfil 
their promises and, most importantly, get them to deliver their votes.” 
As Gibbings, Lazuardi and Prawirosusanto (2017: 252) put it, “The term 
‘contract’ implies a degree of accountability […] As opposed to money 
politics, political contracts tend to be seen in a more positive light.”  
While political contracts are most frequent in the context of clien-
telistic deals offering small-scale pork barrel projects and similar benefits 
to villages or urban neighbourhoods, this model is also applied in other 
circumstances. In particular, in the absence of programmatic parties 
representing lower-class interests, it is available for use by social move-
ments representing the poor. For example, a recent article by Gibbings, 
Lazuardi and Prawirosusanto (2017) drew attention to efforts by the 
Asosiasi Pedagang Kaki Lima Indonesia (APKLI, Association of Indo-
nesian Street Vendors) and other groups representing informal traders to 
mobilise support for political candidates at various levels on the basis of 
formal political contracts. Notably, many labour unions have signed 
political contracts with candidates in local and even national elections 
(Aspinall 2013; Caraway and Ford 2014: 148; Ford 2004: 347).  
For example, in a district-head election in Bekasi in 2012, a local la-
bour union branch made a deal with the candidate from the Golkar Party, 
Neneng Hasanah Yassin, on three issues: a moratorium on outsourcing, 
tightening up labour law enforcement, and building a permanent office 
for a workers’ groups. Nanang was elected, but she only respected the 
deal during her first two years in office; for the next three she ignored it. 
In Karawang, another industrial areas to the east of Bekasi, a member of 
the Metal Workers Union (FSPMI) made a deal with Cellica Nuracha-
diana, a candidate in the 2015 election (Interview, FSPMI members 5 
January 2017). In subsequent years, the regional minimum wage in 
Karawang was the highest in Indonesia, which the activists attributed to 
the contract. Therefore, the effectiveness of such contracts varies: much 
depends on the movement’s capacity for mobilisation, and the candi-
date’s future dependence on its support. Ultimately, given the ad hoc 
nature of such deals, they are vulnerable to abrogation. The fact that 
winning candidates are limited to two terms in office also limits their 
applicability, even in the best of circumstances. 
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The Urban Poor in Jakarta 
In order to understand the political contracts created by urban poor 
activists and gubernatorial candidates in 2012 and 2014, it is helpful to 
briefly review the context of the urban poor in Jakarta. As with Indone-
sia as a whole, poverty is a major problem in the capital city. Official 
statistics from March 2016 show that 384,000 people – 3.75 per cent of 
the total population of Jakarta – were living in poverty. This is low com-
pared to the national poverty rate of 10.86 per cent, but likely underesti-
mates the problem considerably. In Jakarta, there is a significant unregis-
tered population, many of whom are poor. A rough estimate is that 
around 3 million people live in settlements in the Greater Jakarta Region 
that lack basic infrastructure services (Padawangi and Douglass 2015: 
533). 
Housing for Jakarta’s poor has been a problem in Jakarta since the 
colonial era (Abeyasekere 1989: 81). Poor people moving into the city 
have always found ways to shelter themselves, creating urban kampung: 
settlements characterised by informality, irregularity, illegality, flexibility 
and resilience (Jellinek 1991; Murray 1991). Many poor people occupy 
vacant state land, such as that found along railway tracks, rivers and 
roads and under bridges.  
Since the era of Governor Ali Sadikin (1966–1977), housing for the 
poor has been a persistent political problem. Sadikin famously dealt with 
the influx of migrants at the outset of the New Order, and the slum areas 
they created, through a series of policies that mixed developmentalism 
with coercion. He declared Jakarta a “closed city” in 1970 (Abeyasekere 
1989: 222), banning immigrants unless they had a valid ID card and a job. 
He initiated eviction programmes to make way for urban redevelopment, 
and street clearance to remove street vendors and becak (tricycle rickshaw) 
drivers. Starting in 1969, Sadikin also began conducting on-site residen-
tial renovations and providing basic infrastructure in Jakarta’s kampung 
through a “Kampung Improvement Programme” supported by the 
World Bank. Throughout the New Order period, this coercive city im-
provement approach led to repeated waves of sometimes violent land 
clearances and the replacement of many urban kampung by roads, apart-
ment buildings, shopping malls and other developments, but also by the 
gradual upgrading of many settlements (for a critique, see Werlin 1999). 
The advent of democracy layered new political complexities on this 
context. Though post-Soeharto Jakarta governors have generally pursued 
similar urban development goals to their predecessors, they have also 
had to deal with conflicting constituency pressures, especially following 
the introduction of direct gubernatorial elections in 2005. On the one 
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hand, elected officials have faced demands from middle-class voters who 
often view poor Jakartans and their informal livelihoods as the source of 
the traffic jams, flooding and other problems of congestion experienced 
by the city. On the other hand, the poor residents of Jakarta’s urban 
kampung themselves constitute a major vote bank whose support can be 
the difference between electoral success and failure. 
Democracy also widened the political space available to NGOs that 
advocated on behalf of the urban poor. Since the time of Ali Sadikin, 
when the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) provided 
courtroom assistance to displaced squatters, middle-class social activists 
have tried to assist poor Jakartans pressured by government policies. 
During the late New Order, the rise of a new urban poor movement in 
Jakarta was facilitated by broader trends in the NGO scene, with a new 
sensibility of popular empowerment prompting students and other activ-
ists to attempt to organise residents of poor kampung and mobilise 
against evictions.  
Several organisations emerged. One of the most important was the 
Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), which was established in September 
1997. Founded on a belief that it was the people, not elites, who could 
initiate political change, UPC has consistently focused on organising the 
urban poor and on defending their social, economic and political rights. 
Since 1997, the UPC has carried out organising work in 58 kampung in 
Jakarta and established grassroots organisations such as SEBAJA (Serikat 
Becak Jakarta, Jakarta Becak Union). The UPC has also expanded its 
organisation nationally by establishing UPLINK or Urban Poor Link, 
which became JRMK (Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota, Urban Poor Net-
work) in 2002. UPLINK was initially active in 14 regions, but it has 
maintained a presence in eight cities: Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Bandar Lam-
pung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Makassar, and Kendari. In 2009, 
UPC decided that in order to maintain its independence, it would no 
longer take funds from donors. This decision was highly unusual in the 
world of Indonesian NGOs, many of which are acutely aware of their 
problems with donor dependency, and has had a large impact on the 
organisation, driving away some members, but also nurturing an ethos of 
self-reliance among its urban poor supporters.  
This social movement represents the formal tip of a subterranean 
world of informal politics. The urban poor in most developing countries, 
as documented by authors such as Partha Chaterjee (2004), writing on 
India, and Javier Auyero (2001), on Argentina, frequently develop a 
mode of everyday politics in which “informal problem-solving networks 
[…] ensure material survival” (Auyero 2001: 14). The precarious nature 
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of existence of the urban poor, not only in terms of poverty, uncertainty 
of income and poor access to government services, but also frequently in 
terms of illegality of residential status and housing, makes them look to 
their social relations to ensure their survival. For example, Auyero ex-
plained how brokers (in his case, from the Peronist party) play a key role 
in connecting to poor people to the sources of state patronage and sup-
port that can make life bearable. Similarly, Chaterjee drew attention to 
how the poor in India, in order to attain access to recognition and state 
benefits, “must succeed in applying the right pressure at the right places 
in the governmental machinery”; such a process involves mobilising 
against existing structural inequalities but also requires local community 
leaders who “mediate between those who govern and those who are 
governed” (Chaterjee 2004: 66).  
Fluid and complex patterns of brokerage are also typical of the eve-
ryday politics of the urban poor in Indonesia. For example, in her work 
on Indonesian informal traders, Sheri Gibbings has pointed to the medi-
ation role played both by brokers who “are not street traders themselves, 
but have experience organising groups and connections to political par-
ties or government officials”, and by operatives who are themselves 
experienced and respected street traders (Gibbings, Lazuardi and 
Prawirosusanto 2017: 269; see also Gibbings 2013). A similar dynamic is 
visible with the urban poor movement in Jakarta. Most of the key leaders 
and community organisers of the UPC have backgrounds as middle-class 
activists; the founder, Wardah Hafidz, is a nationally known figure, as 
well as being a graduate of Ball State University in the United States, 
while most of the group’s community organisers have university degrees. 
While some UPC activists, including Wardah Hafidz, remain leading 
figures, they now claim they primarily play roles as facilitators, meaning 
they assist activists with urban-poor backgrounds, organised through 
JRMK, to take major leadership roles. For example, if the UPC receives 
an invitation to take part in a meeting organised by an urban poor net-
work abroad, the group will send urban poor representatives, rather than 
the activists, to attend. Therefore, the backbone of the organisation is 
community leaders from poor kampung, who are groomed systematically 
by UPC to organise the urban poor in each kampung.  
These community leaders themselves have varied backgrounds, but 
are typically individuals who have come to prominence by playing a lead-
ing role in organising protests or other activities for the movement itself; 
sometimes they were the initial contact point connecting their kampung to 
UPC, being the person who first sought out the organisation when evic-
tion was initially threatened. Although these grassroots activists typically 
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lack the party connections of urban brokers in India and Argentina, 
many are themselves respected as tokoh masyarakat (informal community 
leaders) by their neighbours, having the capacity to mobilise them for 
protests or influence their voting choices, and being well connected to 
other kampung-level notables and problem-solvers. Some of them have 
almost 20 years’ experience in organising citizens; such people include 
Edi Saedi and Guntoro (Gugun), a Kampung Tongkol (North Jakarta) 
resident, whose area was threatened for eviction under Ahok. Gugun has 
been working as a motorcycle taxi driver with the online platform Grab 
for the past two years and has become a prominent movement activist 
with a significant media profile in his own right, while still living in the 
kampung and seeking his income from a typical kampung pattern of work. 
In Indonesia’s cities, as in India and Argentina, the rise of electoral 
competition and new social movements has expanded opportunities for 
transactional bargaining between representatives of the urban poor and 
politicians, frequently involving mediation by NGO activists, lawyers, 
political operatives and other brokers. But such deal-making has taken 
time to evolve in Jakarta. Governor Sutiyoso (1997–2007), a former 
general, bridged the transition between the authoritarian and democratic 
eras, being appointed as the Soeharto era was drawing to a close but 
securing reappointment in 2002 with the patronage of then-President 
Megawati Soekarnoputri and extensive vote buying in the provincial 
parliament (Steijlen 2002). At this time, the UPC made its first attempt to 
influence the policy process through electoral politics, by nominating 
one of its own members to run as a candidate for governor. This cam-
paign was largely symbolic, given that governors were still elected by the 
local parliament rather than the population at large. Moreover, the nom-
inee, Rasdullah, a becak driver, did not meet the basic administrative 
requirements of candidacy, having failed to attain a high school educa-
tion (Steijlen 2002: 517). During his decade in power, Sutiyoso pursued 
hard-line policies to urban problems, emphasising public order and in-
tensifying efforts to remove street vendors and becak drivers (Nurbianto 
2004). Urban poor groups that protested against his policies sometimes 
faced violent attack by preman, or street thugs (Kompas 2002). 
Next came governor Fauzi Bowo (2007–2012), who had been 
Sutiyoso’s deputy and before that a career bureaucrat and Golkar politi-
cian. In the 2007 election – the first direct gubernatorial election in the 
capital – Adang Daradjatun of PKS was his rival. With gubernatorial 
elections now using a direct vote, and requiring expensive campaigns, 
UPC shifted its strategy. It did not nominate its own cadre, lacking the 
resources to organise a campaign with a realistic chance of success, but 
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instead joined a wider coalition. UPC/JRMK made a deal with Adang in 
which he promised to halt forced evictions for the duration of his five-
year term should he be elected (Interview Edi Suadi, 25 May 2017). It 
was a vague deal, limited to this single item and without a detailed plan. 
But Adang lost, and Fauzi continued Sutiyoso’s harsh urban improve-
ment policies, with his term remembered as a period when the urban 
poor movement had few opportunities to advance its agenda (Widhiarto 
2010).  
A dramatic change came with the 2012 gubernatorial election. For-
mer Solo Mayor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was elected, gaining popularity 
both for his promises to tackle the city’s numerous transport, flooding, 
housing and other problems, and for his ability to connect with ordinary 
voters, including the poor, especially through his trademark blusukan 
meet-the-people style encounters in which he would elicit citizens’ views 
about problems they encountered in daily life (Mietzner 2015). During 
the campaign, Jokowi and his running mate, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama 
(Ahok), made various promises to and agreements with members of the 
urban poor movement. In fact, Jokowi was not the first choice of these 
activists. In the first round of the election that year, UPC/JRMK sup-
ported Faisal Basri, a well-known economist from the University of 
Indonesia who was running as an independent and was well connected in 
civil society networks, including among some of the middle-class intel-
lectuals and urban planners who were linked to UPC. When Faisal was 
knocked out, leaving Fauzi Bowo and Jokowi facing off in the second 
round, UPC/JRMK threw its weight behind Jokowi, doing so on the 
basis of an explicit political contract. The contract was facilitated by 
figures in PDI-P, including the well-known female parliamentarian and 
activist Eva Sundari.  
The contract consisted of three main points. First, Jokowi and 
Ahok promised to involve members of the urban poor in planning, exe-
cuting, and monitoring of three key governance issues: spatial planning, 
formulation of the local budget, and the development programme. Sec-
ond, they promised “fulfilment and protection of citizens’ rights”. Spe-
cifically, they promised to legalise illegal kampung and to provide owner-
ship certificates to people who had been residing on land for more than 
20 years, if the status of that land was not disputed. They also said they 
would pursue kampung renovation rather than eviction. Third, they 
promised to protect actors in the informal economy such as street ven-
dors, fishers, and traditional market traders. The contract was a brief 
one-page document, expressed in sweeping terms, but it was widely 
publicised in poor kampung. 
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Jokowi–Ahok, 2012–2017:  
Promises Kept, Promises Broken 
Once Jokowi became governor and Ahok deputy governor, the pair had 
to perform a delicate balancing act if they wanted to keep their promises 
of overcoming Jakarta’s problems, while also respecting their commit-
ments to the urban poor. In particular, floods were worsening, and re-
ducing their severity meant fixing the city’s reservoirs and clearing rivers 
and canals. These steps required evictions of communities living along 
waterways. In contrast to the coercive approach of the past, Jokowi per-
sonally approached urban poor communities living in target areas, dis-
cussing these problems with them and listening to their wishes.2 
This approach was evident in the evictions caused by upgrading of 
the Pluit reservoir in North Jakarta in 2013. This was a long overdue 
programme of the Jakarta government but was hard to execute because 
it required rehousing 35,000 people living around the reservoir. 
UPC/JRMK had long worked in the area and many residents were 
members. After the election, UPC/JRMK conceded that forced evic-
tions could proceed but insisted that those affected first be provided 
with shelter at nearby locations to minimise disruptions to their daily 
lives. Jokowi agreed, and the Muara Baru multi-storied social housing 
complex was constructed for affected people prior to relocation. Mawar 
(pseudonym), a resident, said that she and her sister received keys to 
their low-cost apartment before they were evicted (Interview, 27 March 
2015). UPC/JRMK members were also happy with the outcome (Inter-
view, Melati (pseudonym), 25 March 2015). 
Jokowi and Ahok also tried to fulfil their promises of better treat-
ment of the urban poor by establishing a programme called “Kampung 
Deret”, which involved renovating row-houses in slum areas. They 
planned to renovate 74 slum locations, with the first and best known, in 
Petogogan, opened in April 2014. A total of 123 homes in Petogogan 
were renovated with funding from the Jakarta budget. The project was 
considered a success, creating a healthier environment with public facili-
ties such as water installations and open space for a children’s playing 
ground (Dewi 2014). However, the programme was halted in 2014 when 
Jokowi became president, in part because the Supreme Audit Agency 
                                                 
2 Recordings of such meetings are available online, for example: <www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=ONn-QfoZMGc>; and <www.youtube.com/watch?v=th 
uIop2pb0s> (22 February 2018). 
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found that the houses in Petogogan were illegal because they were built 
on state land and the owners lacked valid title. 
When Jokowi became Indonesia’s president in 2014, Ahok took his 
place. As Jokowi’s deputy, and during his first year as governor, Ahok 
generally stuck to Jokowi’s approach of using participatory methods to 
find housing solutions for the poor. For example, he was directly in-
volved in the Pluit Reservoir clearances in 2013, and maintained good 
communications with JRMK at that time. As he consolidated his posi-
tion, and in order to address broader housing needs, Ahok prioritised the 
construction of social-low-cost rental apartments (Rusunawa, or Rumah 
Susun Sederhana Sewa; literally, simple rental apartment buildings). The 
goal was to avoid the legal problems that had impeded the kampung deret 
programme by using land that belonged to the Jakarta government. The 
programme involved moving people rather than renovating their existing 
housing, and thus required evictions. 
Meanwhile, to make good on promises to deal with Jakarta’s flood-
ing, in 2014 Ahok began a large-scale project to improve water flow 
along 13 rivers that had been narrowed by unauthorised settlements and 
become shallow due to sedimentation. Ahok aimed to clear settlements 
from up to five metres from the water’s edge along riverbanks, to dredge 
sedimentation from more than 60 kilometres of riverbeds, to construct 
42 kilometres of embankments and to clear green areas in order to im-
prove water absorption. The estimated total cost was USD 190 million, 
USD 140 million of which was to be secured from a World Bank loan. 
In fact, the project had been initiated during Fauzi Bowo’s governorship 
in 2010, but it was only under Ahok that major project execution took 
place.  
One consequence of this project was accelerated evictions of people 
living along riverbanks and in designated green areas. According to a 
report prepared by LBH, during 2015 there were 113 separate instances 
of eviction, with almost 6300 families and over 8,100 small vendors 
affected (LBH 2017: 3). In 2016 there were 193 cases with more than 
5700 families and more than 5300 small-scale enterprises forced to move 
(LBH Jakarta 2017: ii). In pushing through these evictions, Ahok applied 
a different leadership style than Jokowi, emphasising administrative effi-
ciency and strong leadership over participation. According to the LBH 
report, most of the evictions were arbitrary, being carried out without 
negotiations with evictees and most without adequate compensation 
(LBH Jakarta 2017: 34, 48).  
Evictees were promised alternative housing, in the form of rusunawa, 
but Ahok insisted on going ahead with evictions despite a serious back-
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log in rusunawa construction. The government planned to evict more 
than 12,000 families, but units were available for only 1000 (Wardhani 
2015). In fact, the total number of such units owned by the city in 2015 
was 14,187,3 almost all of which were already occupied and subject to 
long waiting lists. The result was that the government asked most 
evictees to survive on their own while waiting for the rusunawa to be 
ready. Another problem was the location of the rusunawa units that were 
available. People evicted from the Kampung Pulo area were lucky; they 
were provided with units in Jatinegara Barat, which was close by. But 
evictees from other sites were less fortunate: those from Kampung Aku-
arium, Pasar Ikan in North Jakarta, as well as from Bukit Duri in South 
Jakarta, were moved to units in Rawa Bebek at the eastern edge of Jakar-
ta, 30 kilometres away. Moreover, Ahok rejected alternatives proposed 
by UPC/JRMK and other urban NGOs like Ciliwung Merdeka and 
Arsitek Komunitas or “Arkom” (Community Architect), such as on-site 
upgrading.4  
Overall, then, Ahok, broke with Jokowi’s pledge to relocate rather 
than evict (gusur bukan geser). The reason was political: Ahok was building 
a reputation as a can-do leader who could bulldoze through the objec-
tions of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and other recalcitrants in order 
to fix Jakarta’s many pressing problems. This approach was evident in 
his handling of budgetary, planning and other issues, and it earned him 
support, especially among the urban middle class. As resistance from 
poor communities affected by evictions mounted, Ahok became increas-
ingly impatient with them, often denigrating them as stubborn and un-
grateful, and depicting them as just another vested interest that stood in 
the way of his plans to improve the city (see, for example, Salim 2015). 
  
                                                 
3 PowerPoint presentation provided by Office of Housing and Buildings, Jakarta 
provincial government. Online: <http://ciptakarya.pu.go.id/bangkim/perdaku 
muh/upload/89-6.%20Paparan%20Penanganan%20Kumuh%20DKI%20Jakar 
ta%202016.ppt> (22 February 2018). 
4 On-site upgrading is an alternative to slum clearance. There have been several 
examples in the post-Soeharto period. In Solo, where Jokowi was mayor be-
tween 2005 and 2012, Arkom facilitated a participatory programme called 
“Kampung Renteng”; in Surabaya, following advocacy by UPC activists, the 
city government cancelled plans to evict a poor community living along the 
banks of the Stren Kali river in 2007, and instead carried out on-site upgrading 
with a requirement that houses be moved two metres from the river. On urban 
planning in these cities, see Bunnell et al. (2013). 
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A New Political Deal: The 2017 Election 
The 2017 Jakarta election attracted much attention among analysts for 
the religious polarisation it engendered (e.g., Lim 2017). In September 
2016, in the lead-up to the official campaign period, Ahok, who is a 
Chinese Christian, spoke at an event in which he warned his audience 
not to be “fooled” by people who use a particular Quranic verse to argue 
that Muslims should not be governed by non-Muslims. Ahok’s oppo-
nents seized upon the comments, alleging that he had insulted the Islam-
ic religion; this led to a series of demonstrations – the largest in post-
Soeharto Indonesia – calling for Ahok’s arrest for blasphemy. Ahok was 
eventually charged, and his trial proceeded throughout the campaign 
period. His two opponents took advantage of this issue to mobilise a 
sectarian campaign against Ahok, which contributed greatly to his even-
tual defeat in the second round held on 19 April 2017, in which Ahok 
won 42.05 per cent of the vote, compared to 57.95 per cent won by 
Anies Baswedan, a Muslim intellectual and former minister of education 
and culture. 
While religious mobilisation was the determining issue in the cam-
paign, indicated by how voting patterns broke down along religious lines 
(Warburton and Gammon 2017), much of the sectarianism occurred off-
stage, in private religious meetings and on social media. Despite large 
rallies opposing Ahok and calling for his incarceration, Ahok’s rivals 
mostly avoided raising the religious issue directly in public election cam-
paigning, such as at campaign rallies, in advertising and in televised de-
bates. Instead, issues of urban planning and management, as well as 
social welfare, featured centrally. For example, the candidates presented 
differing ideas on housing. While Ahok made much of his plans to trans-
form Jakarta into a modern city like Singapore, he also promoted con-
struction of more rusunawa for poor Jakartans. Anies and his running 
mate Sandiaga Uno (commonly known as Sandi) proposed a programme 
of subsidised housing whereby Jakartans would be able to purchase 
homes without making a down-payment. This programme targeted per-
sons with a monthly income of at least 7 million rupiah, putting it out of 
the reach of the poor.  
The evictions that had occurred under Ahok also became a cam-
paign issue. Though opinion polls indicated that the issue was not a 
major concern for Jakartans as a whole (only 10 per cent identified evic-
tions as a policy of Ahok’s that they disliked in one poll conducted two 
weeks before the final round: Charta Politika 2017: 50), both Anies and 
the third candidate, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former pres-
ident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, criticised the harshness of Ahok’s 
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approach. Agus promised that he would “build without evicting” (mem-
bangun tanpa gusur) and, when challenged at a debate, said he would 
achieve this goal by “on-site upgrading” (Kahfi 2017). Much of Agus’s 
campaign was targeted at poor Jakartans, so it is telling that his slogans 
matched those of the UPC/JRMK and other urban poor activist groups. 
Anies promised that he would not evict citizens but only temporarily 
“relocate” them (Astiana 2017). 
Meanwhile, Ahok now had little support among activists. In the 
2012 election, many civil society activists had rallied around Jokowi and 
Ahok, giving rise to a new mode of volunteer-based election campaign-
ing (Suaedy 2014). By 2016, much of this support had evaporated. Urban 
poor activists, in particular, felt betrayed by the evictions that had oc-
curred under Ahok, and were worried about what his programme of a 
“New Jakarta” would mean for the poor (Budiari 2017). However, in the 
lead-up to the first round of the election, held on 15 February 2017, it 
was not yet clear which of Ahok’s opponents would advance to the sec-
ond round. Accordingly, UPC/JRMK did not throw their weight behind 
any candidate, although some individual activists supported Anies or 
Agus. Instead, the groups campaigned on the theme “Gusur Ahok di 
putaran pertama” – “Evict Ahok in the first round”. 
Once Ahok and Anies won in the first round, knocking Agus out of 
competition, UPC/JRMK started to develop a detailed strategy. Ahok’s 
record of evictions meant they wanted to make a deal with Anies. As 
already noted, Anies had spoken out against evictions, even though this 
was not a main plank of his campaign, which instead emphasised such 
matters as the zero-deposit housing programme, a small-scale entrepre-
neurship programme, and education and health care. Even so, the JRMK 
activists were assisted by the fact that they had an entry point into the 
Anies campaign: Marco Kusumawijaya, an urban architect, was the 
founder and former director of RCUS (Rujak Centre of Urban Studies). 
Kusumawijaya had long-standing connections to the urban poor activists 
of UPC and he was personally close to Sandiaga Uno, Anies’s running 
mate. Early on, Marco had planned to run alongside Sandi himself when 
the latter was thinking of standing as gubernatorial candidate. Kusuma-
wijaya become the main advisor to the Anies-Sandi team on urban issues.  
In seeking cooperation with the Anies campaign, the UPC/JRMK 
activists, learning from their past experience, wanted to come up with a 
binding agreement that they would be able to use to hold Anies to his 
promises, should he be elected. In addition, they wanted the agreement 
to be detailed, unlike that of 2012, which had been couched in general 
terms. Finally, they wanted an agreement that would embody, as directly 
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as possible, the concrete demands of the urban communities where they 
conducted advocacy work. 
In order to bring such an agreement into being, the activists worked 
at three levels: a series of “kampung teams” compiled demands in the 
communities, a UPC/JRMK team consisting a mixture of urban-poor 
community leaders and middle-class organisers coordinated the enter-
prise, and an expert team drafted the agreement and negotiated with 
representatives of the Anies campaign. The kampung teams worked in 
sites spread across eight urban precincts (kelurahan) and 31 kampung. 
Some of these locations were long-term UPC/JRMK base areas, and 
others were places where the group had not previously been active. All 
were locations where residents had experienced evictions, or were ex-
pecting them within two years. Coordinators in these kampung – who 
were either longstanding JRMK community leaders or representatives 
chosen by community members – held small-scale consultative meetings 
(musyawarah) to determine residents’ aspirations. These aspirations were 
then compiled by JRMK. Coordinating this effort were mostly members 
of the urban poor, notably the JRMK community leaders, such as Gugun, 
as mentioned above.  
Once they were compiled, the UPC/JRMK activists funnelled these 
aspirations up to the expert team, which consisted of academics, archi-
tects, urban experts and legal specialists, including some from organisa-
tions involved in urban issues, such as Marco Kusumawijaya’s and Elisa 
Sutanudjaja’s RCUS. Many of them were members of “Forum Kampung 
Kota” or Forum for City Kampung, a WhatsApp communication group 
established in early 2014 by Sandyawan Sumardi, a famous Catholic so-
cial activist and the head of Ciliwung Merdeka, an NGO concerned with 
people who live along the banks of the Ciliwung River. There were also 
scholars from the architecture department at Universitas Indonesia who 
had been engaged in UPC activities for a long time, including Herlily (a 
lecturer who had for years been bringing her students to UPC kampung 
and engaging them in various pro bono improvement projects). After 
receiving inputs from the kampung, via the JRMK coordinators, the ex-
pert team then drafted the agreement, translating the demands from the 
kampung into technical language, and negotiating with representatives 
from the Anies campaign. When they felt that the demands raised at the 
kampung level were vague, the UPC/JRMK coordinators contacted the 
kampung coordinators to seek more precise data, including about the legal 
and zoning status of disputed land.  
It should be emphasised that this was a self-directed and self-
financed effort. As mentioned earlier, UPC had not accepted funds from 
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outside donors since 2009, and it applied this principle to electoral en-
gagement, avoiding the taint of money politics. The kampung teams were 
separate from the Anies-Sandi campaign team, and if kampung coordina-
tors were discovered to be already involved in the Anies campaign, they 
were asked to step aside from that role. UPC/JRMK also did not accept 
money from the Anies campaign to fund the various consultative meet-
ings and coordination activities. Instead, kampung residents collected 
small donations to cover coordinators’ transportation costs and compen-
sate them for income they lost by attending meetings. One of the 
UPC/JRMK coordinators, Guntoro, explained that they did not inte-
grate themselves into Anies’s success team because they wanted to main-
tain their independence:  
Our target was to get a policy on halting evictions and providing 
housing rights from the new governor. That was our focus. If we 
were part of his team, our focus could be blurred because they 
have other programmes as well […]. We did not want our own 
team to be absorbed and used for things that were not our main 
focus. (Interview, 17 July 2017) 
The product of this process was a political contract eventually agreed 
between the group and the Anies camp. This was called a “Perjanjian 
Tanah Penggarap” (which might roughly be translated as contract on 
land use) and was signed by Anies, Sandi and representatives of 31 kam-
pung communities on 8 April 2017, 11 days before the second-round vote. 
The contract was an 18-page document that used the language of a legal-
ly binding instrument, purportedly obliging the parties to abide by the 
commitments it contained and, in the event of any violation, giving them 
the right to “sue the party in breach of contract in accordance with pre-
vailing laws and regulations” (article 5).5 The agreement obliged the 31 
kampung representatives who were signatories to secure first-place victo-
ries for Anies in 125 voting stations in 31 locations, spread across eight 
precincts (kelurahan) and six subdistricts (kecamatan). The agreement listed 
all 125 of these voting stations, the vast majority of which were in areas 
where JRMK had long been active and which were sites of long-running 
land disputes (and where, it might be added, Anies was unlikely to lose to 
Ahok).  
                                                 
5 Legal experts have pointed out that the agreement is almost certainly not legally 
enforceable, not least because Anies signed it as a candidate rather than as gov-
ernor (interview, Aldo Felix Januardy, 3 August 2017; see also Hukumonline 
2009). 
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In return, Anies and Sandi promised that, if elected, they would ful-
fil the 46 listed points, each of which had been devised through the itera-
tive process described above. The points were detailed and explicit. For 
example, point number 10 obliged the candidates to change the “De-
tailed Spatial Plan (Rencana Detail Tata Ruang) of Jakarta” so as to 
switch the legal status of land “in the Elektro Kampung, RW (Neigh-
bourhood) 17, Penjaringan Precinct, Penjaringan Subdistrict, North 
Jakarta), from an industrial zone to a zone of very small houses (R2)”. 
Most of the 46 points listed very specific land use and planning changes 
of this kind, detailing a particular location – sometimes a specific street – 
and outlining the exact change in zoning and legal title that was required. 
In most of these cases, the purpose was to provide secure legal status to 
residents in settlements that had already been affected by, or were slated 
for, evictions. Several items obliged Anies and Sandi to legalise the status 
of street vendors in particular locations, or to mediate on their behalf 
with other authorities (such as the authority running the Sunda Kelapa 
port). A couple of points promised financial and employment assistance 
to becak drivers, who had been unable to work in most of Jakarta since 
the Sutiyoso era. The contract acknowledged that if Anies and Sandi lost 
the election, the agreement would not be valid. It also committed the 
pair, if they won, to establish a General Local Public Service Unit 
(BLUD, Badan Layanan Umum Daerah) to work on land security for the 
poor and to enforce the points in the agreement (article 46). The BLUD 
was part of the movement’s long-term strategy: through it, the activists 
wanted to institutionalise an anti-evictions policy and spread it to other 
kampung in Jakarta over the long term. 
The agreement also explicitly stated that Anies and Sandi would im-
plement the points demanded by UPC/JRMK “insofar that they do not 
violate the law and existing rules and regulations” (article 3). This item 
was inserted on the request of Anies’s team and reflected the “adversarial” 
nature of the relationship, indicating that Anies-Sandi’s side would not 
simply agree to every demand from the urban poor. In order to antici-
pate this proviso, the expert team, using information supplied from the 
kampung, had been able to specify the legal status of much of the land 
under dispute and formulate demands in terms that accorded with spatial 
planning rules, especially with regard to zoning. This accounts for why 
the agreement contained so much technical detail. The expert team had 
been careful to include concrete demands that could be acted upon by 
the Jakarta government, avoiding general claims, sweeping rhetoric, and 
demands that required action by national rather than provincial agencies.  
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The spirit of what UPC/JRMK were trying to achieve through this 
agreement was not land reform, in which recipients received full legal 
title over land, but maximisation of land use for the poor instead of 
commercial interests. Most of the items included granted use rights (hak 
pakai), mostly to residents but in some cases to community cooperatives 
or associations. The goal was to ensure the land would not be converted 
into a capital asset and sold by recipients, but would instead perform a 
social function. The model, including the establishment of a land agency 
to monitor and control use of the assets, was based on an approach 
pioneered in Bangkok, where an organisation called CODI (Community 
Organisation Development Institute) ran a programme providing hous-
ing to the poor in 2003–2007 (Yap and Wandeler 2010). UPC activists 
had forged connections with their Thai counterparts and learned about 
this approach through the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR). 
Once the contract was agreed upon, it was the job of the kampung 
coordinators to campaign for Anies in their communities and deliver the 
promised ballot-station victories. Again, they did not accept funds from 
the Anies–Sandi success team, nor did they engage in much expensive 
door-to-door campaigning. Instead, they spread the word through their 
existing networks that the agreement had been reached and that it was 
now the community’s job to deliver on its side of the bargain. This ap-
proach was effective, and Anies–Sandi won by significant margins in all 
designated voting stations, with a vote total at these sites that increased 
by 49.48 per cent, from 26,212 in the first round to 39,189 in the second 
round. However, it should be noted that this increase was not signifi-
cantly higher than that achieved Jakarta-wide, where the Anies–Sandi 
vote rose by 47.72 per cent, from 2,193,530 to 3,240,332.  
After the Victory: From Adversarial to  
Cooperative Linkage?  
Immediately after Anies’s victory, the challenge for the activists was to 
ensure that their political contract would get translated into policy. This 
was an important phase. After the election in 2012, activists had failed to 
build institutionalised links with the new government, instead placing 
trust in Jokowi’s personal goodwill. In 2017, activists tried to build direct 
links with the incoming city administration.  
They did so via a new body that Anies and Sandi established, a 
“synchronisation team” (tim sinkronisasi). The main task of this team was 
to devise a strategy to ensure that the promises the governor-elect had 
made during the campaign would be translated into concrete policies and, 
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as far as possible, funded through the provincial budget which Ahok had 
drawn up earlier in 2017. The team was coordinated by Sudirman Said, a 
former minister of energy and mineral resources, and had 27 members, 
including respected figures such as Bambang Widjajanto, a former com-
missioner of the national Corruption Eradication Commission and Edri-
ana Noerdin a gender specialist. Critically, it also included Marco 
Kusumawijaya, the urban affairs expert who was the major point of 
contact between the JRMK activists and the Anies camp, as well as 
NGO activists Irvan Pulungan (an expert on climate change) and Sukma 
Widyati (an expert on women’s issues) who were also knowledgeable on 
urban issues (Rudi 2017). All had been members of the Anies–Sandi 
campaign team. 
The role of the NGO activists in the synchronisation team was cru-
cial. They can be regarded as “policy brokers” (Sabatier 1998), providing 
the critical linkage between the urban poor activists and the incoming 
government, and translating articles of the political contract into con-
crete policies. On topics like land use and spatial planning, Indonesian 
public administration is a forest of complex rules and regulations. Ex-
perts familiar with this domain are needed in order to steer movement 
demands through the bewildering formal language of the bureaucracy, 
and to avoid pitfalls such as inter-agency rivalry or overlap. The urban 
NGO activists involved in the synchronisation team had the task of 
trying to negotiate the items from the political contract through the bu-
reaucracy, inserting them as policies into the incoming government’s 
programme and ensuring that they had a budget allocation.6 
It is too early to tell how successful they were in this task, with 
Anies having only recently been sworn in as governor at the time of 
writing. However, active interaction between the kampung-level organis-
ers and these NGO activists are continuing, at least in some of the kam-
pung that were at the centre of the deal. After becoming governor, Anies-
formalised a programme of building new housing for the urban poor in 
16 kampung, calling their programme one of “land consolidation” (Sari 
2017). One of the priorities for redevelopment is Kampung Akuarium, 
with residents being targeted for rehousing after they were evicted and 
their homes demolished in April 2016 during the Ahok era (Nugroho 
2017). The plan to rebuild the 16 kampung has been included in the 2018 
Jakarta local budget (APBD), and several of the target kampung are base 
areas of UPC that lent their support to the political contract. In short, in 
                                                 
6 It is not unique for civil society organisations to become policy brokers in this 
way: Lay (2015, 2017) has explored policy lobbying in the national parliament 
on a bill on Aceh Government. 
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the immediate post-electoral context the adversarial linkages of the elec-
tion period seemed to be giving way to a more structured policy linkage, 
but the ultimate outcome will depend on government follow-through in 
the years to come. 
Conclusion: Elections, Popular Agency, and  
Political Linkages in the Context of Weak  
Institutions 
Involvement by urban-poor activists in electoral politics in Jakarta be-
tween 2012 and 2017 involved ‘learning by doing’ – a phrase applied by 
Ford (2014) to labour-movement experimentation with electioneering in 
the Riau Islands. The Jakarta activists learned from the broken promises 
of 2012 and approached a challenger to create a new political contract 
that was, in their eyes, more concrete and more enforceable than what 
they had produced in 2012. Rather than being couched in broad aspira-
tional terms, as with the 2012 agreement, the new contract contained 
very specific demands regarding land status and related issues in specific 
locations.  
We must emphasise the positive aspects of this evolution for the 
urban poor activists and community members involved. Electoral en-
gagement in 2017 involved a far deeper collective process than in 2012. 
It provided an opportunity for this movement to expand political partic-
ipation at the kampung level among members of Jakarta’s poor. Critically, 
it allowed members of these communities to learn about the urban plan-
ning regime that shapes their lives. For example, many kampung dwellers 
had the opportunity, for the first time, to access spatial planning docu-
ments and observe the locations and status of their homes and commu-
nities in those documents, and to think strategically about what sort of 
goals and achievements such documents allowed, in the long term. The 
importance of this process of learning should not be underestimated for 
movement participants.  
Just as importantly, the 2017 engagement was a process that, in crit-
ical respects, led participants away from the patterns of vote buying and 
clientelistic exchange that are so often seen in poor communities during 
Indonesian elections. When poor Indonesians sell their votes in one-off 
material exchanges, they are underlining the paucity of their hopes for 
delivery of ongoing benefits from their elected representatives. Political 
contracts of the type discussed here are an attempt to bind the politician 
they support to future delivery, and to ensnare that politician in relations 
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of accountability. Also, as we have seen, the urban-poor activists deliber-
ately avoided being drawn into the web of clientelistic relations that arise 
around elections, refusing to join the Anies–Sandi campaign team or to 
accept cash payments from it. 
In one critical respect, however, this evolution did not involve the 
type of learning that might be anticipated from the literature on political 
linkages: we do not see evidence of gradual evolution toward a model of 
programmatic politics in which particularistic demands are combined, 
generalised and expressed in terms of a platform with broad appeal. On 
the contrary, electoral engagement in 2017 involved a process of disaggre-
gation rather than aggregation of interests. To be sure, the activists did 
not set aside their long-term goals, and they maintained a broad vision of 
wishing to achieve social justice for the poor. But they realised they had 
to start from very concrete goals. Learning from the experience of 2012, 
the urban-poor network in Jakarta moved from the general to the specif-
ic, trying to hold their candidate to a series of extremely precise demands, 
which they researched and moulded to ensure they would be achievable 
within the existing regulatory framework. 
In part, this pattern resulted from dynamics associated with the ur-
ban poor as a social group. Negotiating complex social terrain is integral 
to the lives of the urban poor. As Ian Wilson has observed with regard 
to Jakarta: 
Poor people operate politically in everyday life on multiple levels, 
which requires the managing of complex relationships, including 
with the powerful, in order to hedge risk, keep options open, en-
croach on spaces and opportunities formally denied them and de-
fend any gains made. (Wilson 2017: 4)  
According to Wilson (2017: 5), the result is politics that is “deeply prag-
matic, instrumental and largely non-ideological”. As we considered brief-
ly above, such observations accord with studies of the politics of the 
urban poor in other parts of the world. In order to survive, poor city 
dwellers forge instrumental links with numerous sources of authority, 
protection and assistance. Their struggle for existence involves not just 
cooperation but also competition for scarce resources, opportunities and 
patronage, and they often seek assistance from overlapping and compet-
ing networks, mediators and patrons. In short, these are patterns of life 
that can readily give rise to atomisation rather than to collective action. It 
is surely possible to view the disaggregation of demands in the 2017 
Jakarta election as reflecting these underlying patterns. Indeed, other 
analyses of electoral engagement by groups claiming to represent the 
interests of the urban poor point toward similar conclusions. For exam-
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ple, Gibbings, Lazuardi and Prawirosusanto (2017) documented how the 
attempt by APKLI to rally informal traders’ support for Prabowo as a 
presidential candidate in 2014 stumbled badly when some of the group’s 
affiliates felt compelled to support Prabowo’s rival, Jokowi, because of 
their ties of obligation to local political patrons, or simply because they 
felt the election was too remote from their own affairs.  
A similar dynamic can be seen among rural and farmers’ move-
ments in contemporary Indonesia. The vast majority of such movements 
are built around struggles over particular land disputes, which typically 
pit village communities against outside developers, such as plantation 
companies or the state forestry agency. These communities themselves 
are often divided, as the developers seek local agents through which to 
gain access to land or negotiate on their behalf, and they frequently result 
in compromise solutions involving compensation or partial recognition 
of land rights. Accordingly, it has sometimes been observed in contem-
porary Indonesia that once their immediate demands with regard to 
rights to land have been redressed, such movements tend to sink back 
into passivity (Bachriadi 2010). This is in contrast to industrial workers, 
for example, many of whose demands (such as for improved wages and 
working conditions) are more readily generalisable across entire popula-
tion groups, and whose conditions of daily labour on the factory floor 
facilitate rather than inhibit collective action. Therefore, it is perhaps not 
surprising that it is among industrial workers and trader unions that we 
see the most sustained and effective attempts to intervene in electoral 
politics.  
What broader lessons can we derive from the Jakarta case about the 
nature and evolution of lower-class political agency in contemporary 
Indonesia? At a general level, and as already emphasised, we can point 
toward the critical importance of complex patterns of brokerage and 
mediation in this form of politics, reinforcing the conclusions drawn by 
Chaterjee, Auyero and others about the politics of the urban poor else-
where. However, focus on mediation and coalitional politics should not 
blind us to the scepticism that underpinned the political contract forged 
during the 2017 Jakarta election. On the contrary, such a focus highlights 
the perseverance and inventiveness with which Jakarta’s urban poor, like 
disenfranchised groups elsewhere, “struggle to make their claims to gov-
ernmental care” (Chaterjee 2001: 75), actively seeking out political alli-
ances and seeking new methods to make them as advantageous as possi-
ble. 
However, attention to the modes of lower-class agency should not 
lead us to exaggerate their effects. Scholars have been observing electoral 
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experimentation by groups representing lower-class interests in Indone-
sian politics for the better part of a decade. We have seen a steady accu-
mulation of the number of case studies, and a commensurate accumula-
tion of examples of political contracts agreed by social movements and 
candidates. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude that there is similarly 
steady accumulation and coordination of such activities, or even an ac-
cumulation of greater and greater gains achieved by poor people from 
such engagement. To be sure, the urban poor activists in Jakarta sought 
to achieve such goals. However, at the micro level, our study of the Ja-
karta election suggests that while learning is taking place, and that this 
model has the potential to challenge the clientelistic patterns that domi-
nate Indonesian political life, the overwhelming impression is still of 
continued atomisation and fragmentation of social movement electoral 
engagement. There is significant scope for highly focused and one-off 
transactions of the sort discussed in this article, which includes a con-
stant pull towards a clientelistic model, but the generalisation of gains 
achieved to more than just isolated pockets of social movement activism 
will ultimately require more sustained efforts to build programmatic 
politics.  
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